



## **Hungarian irredenta in the context of political situation in Central Europe (years 1929 - 1938)**

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The paper is analyzing causes and character of irredentist activities of Hungarian governments in relation to Czechoslovakia during the monitored period. Principal aim of irredenta was to establish an alternative to the direct annexation of Slovakia, or at least of part of the Slovak territory inhabited by the Hungarian minority. The goal of irredenta, besides other, was also to reinforce ethnic awareness of the Hungarian population in Slovakia, to cultivate a historic legacy of Hungary and to eliminate integral processes, which could weaken connections of members of the Hungarian community toward their kin country. Parallel with the increase of political instability during the second half of thirties, intensify also irredentist activities among ethnic Hungarians. The status of majority of Hungarians living in Slovakia was dramatically changed after the annexation of the majority of Hungarians to Hungary.

Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Irredenta. Vienna Arbitrage.

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Since establishment of Czechoslovak Republic and Hungarian Kingdom, one of the most neuralgic issues affecting relation of both countries was so called *irredenta*. By decision of Victorious Powers Slovakia, territory which till end of Great War belonged to Hungarian kingdom became an integral part of Czechoslovakian Republic (CSR). This geopolitical arrangement resulted in inclusion of almost three quarters of millions of ethnic Hungarians, who were living mostly in the Southern Slovakia, into Czechoslovak state. These people find themselves in a new situation - as a community in unwanted position of minority. Contrary to pre-war Hungary, where ethnic Hungarians belonged in many ways to privileged segment of population, in Czechoslovakia they must cope with number of difficulties. Czechoslovakia was established as a unitary state, where dominant position occupied so called *state forming* Czechoslovak nation. Consequently, Hungarians perceived CSR as a state which was foreign to them. This was enhanced by a fact, that regions inhabited by Hungarians were included to CSR without their consent and against their will. They considered this an occupation of their homeland and in many ways, though surreptitiously, were cultivating their relations to their kin country - Hungary. Full of resentment toward Czechoslovakia were especially members of aristocracy and intelligentsia, who were stripped of their privileged status, positions in Hungarian state apparatus and due to land reform of their property.

Political leadership of post-war Hungary, in which position of influence retain aristocracy, made foremost

principle its internal and namely foreign policy to regain "lost" territories and populations - a policy summarily defined as irredenta. Hungarian endeavors to annex Slovakia found a large number of sympathizers not only among ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia. This caused not only frictions between Czechoslovakia and Hungary but also placed a heavy burden upon Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In a sense Hungarians found themselves between "a rock and a hard place". On one side they naturally inclined to Hungary, were influenced by Hungarian culture, history and patriotic upbringing and for many of them Slovak language was unintelligible and on another side, they must cope with legal and economic realities of Czechoslovak state. Besides language inefficiencies - many Hungarians living in compact settlements of Southern Slovakia did not speak Slovak at all or only insufficiently, it was question of trust. They were viewed as potential enemies of state. This became evident after creation of ethnically oriented Hungarian political parties.

CSR was established as a democratic country. In line with Czechoslovak constitution, adopted in February 1920, foundation of political parties, cultural and religious associations could be established practically without limits. In relatively short period of time various political subjects were built, including parties representing Hungarian minority. During the existence of CSR two parties retained a dominant position in Hungarian community - Provincial Christian-Socialist Party (LCSP) and Hungarian National Party (HNP). In regard to political preferences it is necessary to mention, that Hungarian community was not a homogenous society. Political, professional, religious and social differences were profound and influenced attitudes of members of Hungarian community in many ways. This was reflected also in disparate, frequently incongruous political objectives of both Hungarian main parties. It had distinctive electorates - unlike LCSP, which attracted mainly Catholics, Hungarian National Party was more heterogeneous, its voters were Protestants (a large share of them were Calvinists) and also a sizeable segment of Jewish population. A significant difference between both parties was their attitude toward Czechoslovakian state. Unlike Hungarian National Party which since its inception in the middle of twenties endeavored to establish some form of modus operandi with Czechoslovak ruling political subjects, Land Christian-Socialist Party pursued uncompromising opposition policy. Consequently, state authorities perceived LCSP as the main perpetrator of irredenta in CSR. Despite declarations of chairman of LCSP Géza Szűlő, who frequently reiterated, that party policy is not aimed against state, state institutions and security authorities characterized Land Christian-Socialist Party as extended hand of Budapest in Slovakia. This attitude was reflected also in government supported periodicals.<sup>[1]</sup>

A significant political event at the close of year 1929 was elections to National Assembly. Diverse political scene comprised of coalition of governing Czechoslovakian parties and opposition - communists, autonomist Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (HSPP) and parties representing the Hungarian community (LCSP and HNP). Criticized as an enemy of state and exponent of irredenta was namely chairman of Land Christian-socialist Party, G. Szűlő. Because Hungarian National Party was viewed as more moderate than LCSP, periodical *Slovenská Krajina* (Slovak country) expressed disappointment that leader of HNP, J. Szent-Ivány, agreed to go into elections in coalition with LCSP and this way "subjected HNP to dictate of LCSP."<sup>[2]</sup>

Even though coalition of LCSP and HNP was successful in attracting voices of Hungarian voters, both parties remained in opposition and situation of Hungarian population did not improve. On the contrary, due to economic crisis, which negatively affected primarily less moneyed segments of population (not only Hungarians) even worsened.

Growing economic deprivations contributed to dissatisfaction of Hungarians living in Slovakia and became one of the reasons that irredentist sentiments were deeply rooted in Hungarian community. However, significant, if not the most important factor in maintaining irredenta among Hungarians living in Slovakia, were revisionist activities in Hungary proper. Hungarian governments regardless of their composition never accepted the Trianon Peace Treaty, which allocated Slovakia to Czechoslovak Republic. Large Hungarian minority and sizeable portions of non-Hungarian populations living in Slovakia - Jews, Germans and also Slovaks, who were "magyarized", that is were educated in pre-war Hungarian schools and voluntarily, in some cases enthusiastically "embraced" Hungarian culture and became Hungarian patriots, reinforced Hungarian government determination to regain Slovakia. A vision of "Great Hungary", which by absorbing various non-Hungarian communities and fusing them into ethnically unified Hungarian nation was destroyed by geopolitical changes after Great War. As British historian and publicist R. W. Seton-Watson accurately noted, that „projected goal of national assimilation was so close, explains extraordinary bitterness, with which Hungarian nationalists viewing after-war situation in Slovakia. Their prize was taken from their hands in last hour.“<sup>[3]</sup>

The aim to support an idea of revision and made this intention popular among Hungarians was upheld by

organization named Revision League (RL). The activities of RL consisted of lectures from fields of history which were aimed to prove justification of Hungary to claim to "historic" lands including Slovakia, of organizing protest demonstrations, of publicizing articles in periodicals and monographs criticizing the Trianon Peace Treaty as a reason for all difficulties which Hungary and her people have. As circular issued on 22 August by Land Office in Bratislava (LOB) indicate, that RL was distributing materials with irredenta content throughout Slovakia.[4] Propaganda activities of Revision League registered also Czechoslovak Embassy in Paris.[5] In circular information dated 14 June 1931, LOB wrote that measures were adopted in Budapest to reorganize irredentist activities in Hungary. According to report, nationally oriented associations were about to be divided geographically into four groups. Their irredentist activities shall be coordinated in line with instructions issued by Revision League. More active participation was expected from émigrés from Czechoslovakia and university students. An emphasis was placed upon family relations among Hungarians living in Hungary and Hungarian minority members living in Slovakia as to gain information and also to cultivate mutual relations, which can be useful in future. Proves of oppression of Hungarian minority members should be gathered and interpreted in a way, which can be used in League of Nations to accuse Czechoslovakia of breaching her commitments to protect minorities.[6]

In circular from 3 March 1936 LOB called attention to request issued by "Nyukosz" (An union of retired military officers in Hungary) in which they were asked to sign a proclamation that they will propagate a revision of Trianon Treaty and will support all actions aimed to foster position of Hungary including irredentist activities. LOB asked state authorities in Slovakia to pay attention to this request and monitor all pensioned Hungarian military personnel living in Slovakia.[7]

After Anschluss of Austria, Adolf Hitler openly stated his intention to annex the western parts of Czechoslovakia. This increased revisionist activities also in Hungary. An illustrative example of anti-Czechoslovak attitudes was a demonstration 24 of April 1938, organized by Revision League. Leaders of demonstration adopted a resolution in which accused Czechoslovak Republic of violating rights of minorities and endangering peace in Europe.[8]

Tenth anniversary of the the Trianon Peace Treaty[9] roused in Hungary a wave of public protests. Public meeting, work stoppages, closing of stores and ringing bells in churches signaled how intensively Hungarians were feeling a "Trianon trauma". A memorandum to League of Nations was dispatches, in which participants of gathering throughout Hungary demanded revision of TPC via "peaceful means".[10]

In regard to revision activities of various Hungarian associations, Czechoslovak authorities paid detailed attention to situation in Hungary. In report, elaborated by Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior, dated 21 October, is stated that an influential Hungarian politician, count István Bethlen in his speech from 22 of May formulated goals of revision propaganda. I. Bethlen said, that revision propaganda must be not carried out only by civil organizations, but primarily it is Hungarian diplomacy, which has a duty to foster revision idea abroad. Bethlen initiated establishment of so called Executive Revision Commission, whose members were several important Hungarian politician such as count Pál Teleky, count Miklós Bánffy, Kálmán Kánya and others. Allegedly, this non-government organization directed all Hungarian foreign activities, especially relation with Italy and Germany. In report is also information about alleged secret agreement concluded between István Bethlen and Adolf Hitler in which an unconditional support of Hungarian claims on Slovakia by Germany was promised.[11]

Hungarian endeavors to gain support for her policy of revision became constant target of criticism by Slovak periodicals financed by political parties of government coalition. Besides Germany, the main supporter of Hungary in Europe was fascist Italy. Consequently, close relations between both countries were classified as a dangerous for peace in Europe. A regional periodical *Národný týždenník* (National Weekly) wrote about shipments of arms from Italy to Hungary, because Hungary is viewed by Italians as an ally in its ambitions in Balkan.[12] Daily *Slovenský východ* (Slovak East) wrote about cordial relations between British and Hungarian aristocracy, which are used by Hungary to propagate her revisionist claims. In that regard is mentioned noticeably lord H. Rothermere, owner of periodical *Daily Mail*, who tried to rouse sympathy for Hungary in Great Britain.[13]

Police Directory in Košice in its report from 8 of June 1933 informed Land Office in Bratislava about study elaborated by I. Bethlen in which he delineated strategy of approach to ethnic minorities living in neighboring states. These communities, according to Bethlen, should be reassured that living conditions of minorities in Hungary is better than in neighboring states and after they return to Hungary, they will be in better position to develop their culture. Second reason for ethnic communities such as Slovaks, Ruthenians etc. to return to Hungary is lack of possibilities to build their "national individuality" in states

which were established after Great War. After all, these communities were integral parts of Hungary for millennia.<sup>[14]</sup> Even though opposition Hlinka's Party never contemplated re-union of Slovakia with Hungary, criticized anti-revisionist campaign organized by government parties on 11 June 1933 in several localities, refused to participate on them and accused parties of ruling coalition of mismanagement of economic situation in Slovakia.<sup>[15]</sup> That a large segment of Slovak population is longing for return to Hungary should testify a Slovak émigré František Jehlicska during the series of lectures of I. Bethlen in London. Jehlicska, a chairman of so called Slovak National Council in exile, argued that Slovak community was in pre-war Hungary utterly satisfied.<sup>[16]</sup>

Hungarian policy of revision and irredentist activities in Czechoslovakia were supported by political leaders of Poland. Poland, similarly as Hungary, had territorial claims against CSR. Both countries were claiming Tesen region. A compromise imposed by Victorious Powers after Great War. Enmity was exacerbated during war between Poland and Soviet Russia. When Soviet Army threatened Polish capital Warsava, on 11 August 1920, German and Czech social democratic parties published joint declaration supportive of Soviets. In addition to this, Czech leftist blocked transport of military hardware and munition to Poland from France. Also T. G. Masaryk refused request to allow transport of military material to Poland.<sup>[17]</sup> Poland never forgot this. Poland's hostile propaganda against CSR intensified after signing agreement between Poland and Germany on 26 January 1934.<sup>[18]</sup>

However territorial claims on Tesen were not only one. Poland requested certain regions in Northern Slovakia. Menacing to CSR was also an intention of Hungary and Poland to set-up a common boundary line, which could be achieved only by occupying Czechoslovak territory.<sup>[19]</sup> These were reasons that Poland financed and provided support for Slovak exponents of Hungarian irredenta. *Robotnícke noviny* (Workers News) informed about gathering of foremost irredentistic representatives - Unger, Jehlicska, Dworczak, Bajan and Mendschein in Polish Tesen. Paper pointed to gathering of Hungarian irredenta activists as a proof of anti-Czechoslovak attitude of Poland.<sup>[20]</sup>

In his report from 1 of August, Czechoslovak ambassador in Budapest informed about Mussolini's expressions of support for Hungary. On 20 July Mussolini spoke to a delegation of Hungarian students in Rome to whom he said that he is firmly convinced that without rectifying of injustice committed against Hungary lasting peace in Europe is impossible. He said that his wish is justice for Hungary and that young people in Hungary will fight for justice. That justice for Hungary is inevitable if peace in Europe is to be kept, wrote Mussolini in an article which was reprinted in Budapest paper *Pester Lloyd* on 19 of July. Ambassador Miloš Kobr acknowledged certain positive reaction in Hungary, however, because Italy is more supportive only verbally, Hungarian public was, according to M. Kobr somewhat skeptical.<sup>[21]</sup>

The difference between revision and irredenta on example policies of prime minister Gyula Gömbös and former prime minister István Bethlen tried to define *Slovenský deník*. According to Bethlen the open quest for revision, that is, change of boundaries via military or peaceful means is, considering political situation, not realistic and in that sense he criticized Gömbös as a politician who is detrimental to interests of Hungary. Bethlen suggested that in present situation is far more effective to foster irredentistic activities of minorities living outside Hungary and this way keep national identity of these communities preserved. This change of strategy, wrote *Slovenský deník*, will have an impact upon Slovak Hungarians. Irredentists, represented namely by Géza Szülő, could hope for political and financial support from Budapest. *Slovenský deník*, rather curiously, commented reaction of irredentistic faction in Hungarian community on possible shift in policy of Budapest: "Our irredentists are overly pleased that revision is rescinded, because now principle of policy pursued by Bethlen will be applied, that is a policy of irredentism."<sup>[22]</sup>

In context of alleged change Hungarian policy heralded by count Bethlen, periodical *Slovenský východ* wrote, that abandoning revision policy by Hungary was caused by loss of confidence, almost vassalage attitude toward Italy. Italian verbal declarations of support, but without any tangible deeds were of no use to Hungary. Another source of disappointment were improving relations of Italy to France and Yugoslavia. These developments caused switch of Hungarian policy and, according to *Slovenský východ*, "Neighbors of Hungary should be undermined with help of Hungarian minorities living in their territories."<sup>[23]</sup>

A chain of menacing political developments occurred after gaining a monopoly of power by Adolf Hitler in Germany. Political instability in Germany was replaced by a dictate of Nazi Party. A clear proof that Germany will try to change existing geopolitical status quo was a plebiscite in the Saar territory, were on January 13, 1935 inhabitants of the Saar approved return to Germany. On this occasion Hitler proclaimed that Germany has no further claims in Western Europe (he meant region of Alsace and Lorraine), but in



regard to Central Europe he was unwilling to specify Germany's policy. Plebiscite in the Saar roused hopes in Hungary, that a similar development could be enacted in regions inhabited by Hungarian minority members. Land Office in Bratislava informed security authorities in Slovakia (19 April 1935) about rumors spreading by "agents of Hungarian government" in several localities in Slovakia (Žitný ostrov, Banská Bystrica), that the League of Nations will initiate a plebiscite also in Slovakia. LOB instructed security authorities to initiate "the most detailed search" and to arrest all persons involved in spreading such a rumors. According to Land Office in Brno, the leading official of Hungarian press service declared that "Hungarians are grateful to Germany for plebiscite in Saar. On this example Hungarians, witnessed what can be achieved if a nation is united, has enough courage and set for itself a certain goal." LOB informed that Hungary sent activists into Netherland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland who will be lobbying for Hungarian interests. The aim was to induce of these countries to send observers to states where Hungarian minorities live and determine their actual status. On the basis of their findings Hungary will request plebiscite.[24]

In October 1935 *Slovenský východ* published a series of articles penned by B. Šolc,[25] which were analyzing Hungarian foreign policy. According to author, Hungarian policy was pursuing two ways to achieve its goals - a, by means of peaceful propaganda in countries such as France and Great Britain; b, by making cooperating with states who are willing to use violence in eliminating existing peace treaties, namely Germany and Poland. In England the most significant ally was aristocracy which maintained close relations with Hungarian nobles. In that sense a singularly important supporter of aims of Hungarian revision propaganda was Lord Rothermere, a publisher of periodical *Daily Mail*, who unequivocally supported Hungarian political goals, especially revision demands.[26] Šolc argued that true motivation of Lord Rothermere was ambition to be elected as King of Hungary.[27] Šolc admitted that a number of members of Upper Chamber of British Parliament sided with "Hungarian cause" to large extent under influence of lectures given by I. Bethlen during his journey in England. As a result 168 deputies signet an appeal to British government to submit Hungarian grievances to League of Nations. Only by interference of British Foreign Office was this request denied. According to author of articles, a shift in Hungarian foreign policy from adherence to Italy to Germany and Poland was caused by a neutral stand of Hungary in regard to struggle between Italy and Germany over influence in Austria. Consequently, Italy ceased her support of Hungarian revision.[28]

That there were in British Parliament deputies inclined to revise existing peace treaties indicate report of Czechoslovak Embassy in London dated 26 July 1936 about resolution initiated by Sir Robert Gower and his associates in Lower Chamber stating that the principal aim of British foreign policy should be to prepare base for revision of peace treaties and to suggest to League of Nations to enact changes in existing treaties which would contribute "to pacification of world".[29]

In the middle of 1936 political situation in Hungary changed. Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös, a staunch supporter of pro-German orientation, died. New premier, Kálmán Darányi, was much more inclined to build relations with the Western states. Darányi's orientation on West enticed hopes that Hungary will take more even handed approach in European politic.[30] There were justified worries in regard to growing influence of Germany. On March 7 German army entered demilitarized Rhineland region. This was clear violation of Versailles Peace Treaty. France abstained from any interference except verbal protest. In addition to that, Hitler used pact between France and Soviet Union as a pretext to denounce Locarno Treaty. All this offered, in valuation of Budapest, a new opportunity for revision. Hungarian Regent Miklós Horthy in August 1936 paid visit to Hitler in his mountain residence at Obersalzberg. *Slovenský východ*, citing international periodicals, reported about Horthy's visit in Germany.[31] Even though Horthy in his memoirs did not mention concrete content of talks with Hitler, according to Slovak historik Ladislav Deák, Horthy suggested to Hitler a joint military operation against CSR. This however is hardly believable, considering weakness of Hungarian army and Deak himself admitted that also German army was at that time small and insufficiently armed.[32]

Political representatives viewed rise of Nazi Germany with worries, but it was clear, that decision nullify peace treaties, voiced openly by Hitler is offering opportunity also for revision aims of Hungary. Dilemma faced by Hungary was reflected during conference attended by Italy, Austria and Hungary on 12 January 1938. Austria and Hungary refused to be drawn too close to Germany and Italy and they declined to join pact against Communist International. In spite of refusal, Hungary gained support of Italy and Austria to rearm.[33]

In report from 18 February, addressed to Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, ambassador M. Kobr commented on his conversation with Kánya during which Hungarian foreign minister expressed his worries from future development of political situation.[34]

A completely new situation emerged after occupation of Austria by Germany, which entered into history as infamous "Anschluss". This was a flagrant violation of status quo in Europe, which France and England did not resist. It propelled Germany to a position of power arbiter in Central Europe and made a deep impact upon all states in Central Europe including Hungary. In his report from 15 March, Kóbr informed about impact of Anschluss upon public perception and political leadership in Hungary. Hungarian government, which allegedly expected "natural" development leading to Anschluss, was taken by surprise by "brutal" act of Germany. According to Krno, Hungarian political representatives had clear imagination about consequences of Anschluss, several grave threats arose for Hungary - Germany gained direct boundaries with Hungary and this way a balance of power in Central Europe was eliminated; Austria as a member of "Rome group" of countries disappeared and this created a "vacuum" which needs to be filled; no resistance of Italy to Anschluss roused a distrust in Hungary; in regard to military situation, after disappearance of Austria as a buffer state, there was a categorical imperative for Hungary to speed build-up of her army. [35]

In spite of worries and resentment in regard to German occupation of Austria on diplomatic level Kánya pursued policy of solidarity with Germany. Hungarian press was instructed to abstain from any criticism of Germany and Hungarian ambassador Döme Sztójay congratulated to German leaders, characterizing Anschluss as union "of two good old friends, who as a consequence of peace treaties found themselves in an impossible situation". [36]

Fear of Germany has impact upon Hungarian policy toward Slovakia. In his speech in Foreign Commission of Hungarian Parliament Kálmán Kánya informed that Czechoslovak Prime Minister Milan Hodža promised to work for improvement of status of Hungarian community in Slovakia. [37] István Bethlen, who also was present at the meeting, argued that in the interest of Hungary would help to establish cooperation among Slovak autonomists, Sudetendeutsche Party and Hungarian community in Slovakia. If political objectives of these three groups could be connected, they would have better chances to prevail. [38]

Similarly as in Czech part of Republic, where crisis erupted among German activist political parties, also Hungarian activists in Slovakia encountered difficulties. The pro-government press, however, denied weakening of activist Hungarian parties and presented Hungarian activists as loyal to Republic and resisting to lures of opposition United Hungarian Party (UHP). [39] *Robotnícke noviny* argued that Hungarian social democrats were resisting exhortations of United Hungarian Party and only few of them joined ranks of UHP. [40] Similarly, desertions of Hungarians from Agrarian Party were miniscule, asserted *Slovenský juh* (Slovak South). [41] Daily *Novosti* (News) praised allegedly brave stand of Hungarian activists, who faced-off pressure of Hungarian opposition. [42] In contradictory manner evaluated situation periodical *Slovák*, the official daily of autonomist Hlinka's Party, which stated that impact of Anschluss upon Hungarian activism was clearly negative. [43]

Anschluss influenced also the political developments in Hungary. On May 13 Prime Minister Kálmán Darányi resigned and recommend to this post President of Hungarian National Bank Béla Imrédy. The reason, according to periodical *A-Zet* was an aim to neutralize leader of Hungarian Nazis pro-German Ferenc Szálasi. [44] According to periodical *Slovenská politika* (Slovak Politic), Imrédy sharply attacked Nazis. Nazis were perceived as dangerous to security of state and prohibited to be employed in state apparatus. [45] Transformation of political scene in Hungary summarized *Slovák*. [46] *Slovenský deník* wrote that Imrédy documented his anti-Nazi stand during his speech on public gathering on 26 June in Debrecen. [47]

In Slovakia representatives of Hungarian community negotiated with Prime Minister Hodža about implementation of government program of reforms which should improve a status of ethnic minorities, so called Statute of Nationalities, future situation of Hungarian minority. *Slovák* reported that Hungarian leaders requested reform of state citizenship in Slovakia. This should be awarded only to "native inhabitants" of Slovakia that is to Slovaks, Hungarians and Germans. Among other requests were demanded a revision of land reform and new census. [48] Demands of Hungarian community leaders were characterized by *Robotnícke noviny* as utterly non-realistic and "provocative". [49]

Besides conviction that Hungarian minority in Slovakia should be united, there was no unity among Hungarian political leadership, what strategy to pursue toward Czechoslovakia, Slovak autonomists and Hungarian community. Eventually it was decided that it would be necessary to offer to Hlinka's Party autonomy in frame of Hungary. On May 7 Hungarian ambassador in Czechoslovakia, Wettstein received instructions in that sense. [50]

Realization, that to succeed in plans of revision it is necessary to gain a good will of German dictator, led Regent Horthy to visit Hitler on August 22 in Port of Kiel. *Robotnícke noviny* noted that *"Horthy's visit in Germany is rousing a big attention and an exceptional significance is ascribed to it. Especially noticeable is Hitler's endeavor to show to his visitor a military might of Germany."* [51] *Slovenská politika* reported that *"With the visit of Horthy they are connected various combinations, beside others also a rumor that Germany is trying to attach Hungary to herself more firmly, so in this way Hungary will be not gained for cooperation with Little Entente."* [52] Despite cordial welcome - in port of Kiel Horthy and his entourage participated on initiation of battle cruiser Prince Eugen, named after a heroic personality of Hungarian history, visit of Hungarian delegation was for Hitler a disappointment. Hungarians not only denied willingness to participate in an armed attack on Czechoslovakia, but Hungary concluded an agreement with Little Entente. [53]

Hungarian leaders tried to balance its policy also by cultivating relations with members of Little Entente - Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Preliminary negotiations resulted [54] in agreement to hold a conference of Little Entente members and Hungary in Yugoslav Bleda, which started on 21 August 1938. Standing Council of Little Entente issued on 23 August a communique in regard to agreement between member states of Little Entente and Hungary. [55] Communist Party periodical *Slovenské zvesti* (Slovak Reports) positively valued fact, that Hungary was coerced to give-up to use of violence in relation to Czechoslovakia. [56]

About attitudes of Hungarian leaders after their visit in Germany and about signing of agreement with Little Entente informed ambassador Kobr, in several reports dispatched to Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague. In report, dated September 2 he described impressions of K. Kánya from visit of Germany: *"In circle of people who are close to Hitler and among persons who hold powerful positions exist two directions: one is decisively for keeping up peace, second is not afraid of risk of war ...decision depends now exclusively on Hitler; which one it will be, nobody now knows, perhaps not even he himself"* [57] K. Kánya did not hide, reported M. Kobr, that controversial point of talks with Hitler was question of approach of Hungary toward Czechoslovakia. He avoid direct answer, indicated however, that even though neutrality is a constant of Hungarian policy, it could come to situation, which would necessitated change of Hungarian. In the final part of his report M. Kobr informed about attitudes of German politicians in regard to Sudeten Germans. For Czechoslovakia, said K. Kánya, there was no other alternative then to accept requests stated during congress of SdP in Karsbad. [58]

Hungarian insistence on policy of neutrality was not kept in secret. Imrédy in interview for *Daily Telegraph* openly defined neutrality as the fundamental principle of Hungarian policy. [59] About consequences of Imrédy's statement informed Kobr in report from September 7 - *"This interview...naturally roused in Budapest great attention, because whole tenor and direction is permeated by spirit of anti-German sentiments."* Ambassador expressed opinion, that despite denial of Budapest *"German - Hungarian relations suffered a serious wound"* [60] This had serious consequences during Munich conference. Hitler, irritated by Hungarian policy, refused to accept to deal with request of Budapest in regard to issue of revision.

Intransigence of Sudeten German Party and refusal of Czechoslovakia to, in any way relinquish territorial integrity of Republic, resulted in stalemate and threatened that peaceful solution will be impossible to find. Therefore, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Neville Chamberlain chose a possible solution - use of mediator, who would negotiate with both sides with hope to find compromise. British Foreign Minister Lord Halifax informed French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier about his intention. Daladier agreed. Despite initial reluctance of Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš, agreement was reached and on 3 August Lord Walter Runciman arrived in Prague as *"mediator and investigator"* who, however, officially had no direct mandate from British government. [61]

Leaders of Hungarian minority in CSR perceived Runciman's arrival as welcome opportunity to voice their grievances and decided to write a document in which they would summarize unsatisfactory situation of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. On August 2 representatives of Hungarian United party prepared memorandum named *"A situation of Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia."* Authors of documents argued that demands of Hungarian minority are in line with peace treaties and with right of self-determination anchored in these treaties. As a baseless they judged opinion that unequal status of Hungarians is caused by their a priori negative attitude toward CSR. Falseness of this argument is proven in opinion of authors, by the fact that Hungarians are paying taxes and serving in military same as Czechs and Slovaks. [62]

On 10 august Esterházy submitted Memorandum to Runciman during his visit in Prague. On 12 august

Runciman was visited by János Esterházy, Géza Szűllő and Andor Jaross. Runciman allegedly expressed opinion that improvement of Hungarian minority situation can be achieved in frame of Czechoslovakia in the same way as in case of German minority.[\[63\]](#)

The second half of September was marked by increasing aggressiveness of Germany. Especially attacks upon Czechoslovakia intensified. A. Hitler threatened to invade CSR if his demands will not be met. In tense atmosphere deputies of Hungarian United Party in Czechoslovak parliament met on 17 September in Bratislava and adopted a resolution in which they for the first time during existence of CSR openly demanded right of self-determination.[\[64\]](#)

Hungarian cause was took-up again by Italy. On September 21 Italian Foreign Minister Ciano met with Polish ambassador Dlugoszowsky and Hungarian ambassador Villani. *Slovák deník* wrote that Italy, Hungary and Poland decided to protect rights of Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia and also that they will demand a plebiscite for Slovaks with question if Slovaks want to remain in Czechoslovakia or they want to be reunited with Hungary. At the same time Italian periodicals commenced a campaign demanding that jointly with solving of status of Sudeten Germans was, to be solved also a status in Hungarians in Slovakia.[\[65\]](#)

After collapse of negotiations with Hitler in Bad Godesberg, Chamberlain suggested 28 September, to Mussolini a conference. Mussolini, who was afraid of war, agreed. Hitler condescended on condition that conference will commence next day. The forth participant was chosen France. Prime Minister Daladier invitation accepted.[\[66\]](#)

Hungarian representatives tried to assert their demands also during the Munich conference. Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, Sztójay Döme, approached on 28 September Göring asking, if territorial demands of Hungary will be also negotiated. Though it was not truth, Göring reassured ambassador, that Germany will support Hungarian demands. Consequently, Sztójay informed Budapest about promise given by Göring and suggested that count come to Munich. Csáky arrived to Munich and met Mussolini. During audience 29 September Mussolini reassured Csáky, that immediately after status of Sudeten Germans he will submit Hungarian demands to conference participants. However, Hitler denied to this request. It was not in interest of Germany deal with this issue. Hitler was aware, that after conclusion of Munich conference it will be solely his decision how territorial demands of Poland and Hungary will be solved.[\[67\]](#) Periodical *Robotnícke noviny* criticized hostile behavior of Poland and Hungary, and warned that Hungary and Poland will soon pay for their short eyed policy.[\[68\]](#) In case of Poland prediction shown to be terribly right.

On September 30 1938 Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy signed so called Munich Agreement in which signatures consented to award Germany regions in Czechoslovakia where members of German minority lived in proportion larger than 51%.

After Munich Agreement the political development of Slovakia underwent a radically new phase. Till then a main opposition party - Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, asserted its political power and took reins of power in Slovakia. Autonomy of Slovakia became a reality. However, parliamentary democracy was replaced by authoritative political system in which HSPP held dominant political power.

Transfer of contested territories should be resolved during negotiation between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, designed to be carried out in City of Komarno.

A new situation demanded also to solve a status of Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Munich Agreement created a precedent for territorial demand of Poland and Hungary. Whereas Poland demanded a coal rich territory of Teschen, Hungary required that Southern Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ukraine became an integral part of Hungary.

*Slovenská politika* reacted to this necessity - "In protocols and resolutions of Munich Conference of four powers was indirectly suggested that now an issue of status of Hungarian community living in Southern Slovakia should be solved. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta submitted to Hungarian ambassador in Prague a note containing a suggestion of Czechoslovak government to in nearest time to set-up a common Czechoslovak - Hungarian commission with task to resolve issues connected with status of Hungarian community in Slovakia..."[\[69\]](#) Necessity to solve a status of Hungarian community commented also other Slovak periodicals.[\[70\]](#) *Novosti* informed that Hungarian ambassador demanded several times that Czechoslovakian government enacted measures which will ensure same rights for members of Hungarian minority as were awarded to ethnic Germans and a right of self-determination.[\[71\]](#)



The Munich agreement had a profound impact upon political situation in Czechoslovakia. The fabric of government started to crumble. On October 5 President Beneš abdicated and was established a new government led by general Jan Syrový. Volatile political atmosphere after signing of Munich Agreement enabled Hlinka's Party to take initiative to press its program of autonomy of Slovakia.

Day after abdication of President Beneš, an agreement, a document so called the Žilina Agreement, was concluded. It accepted adoption of law in regard to autonomy of Slovakia as was proposed by Hlinka's Party in June 1938 and empowered J. Tiso to set-out the first Slovak government. Leadership of Hlinka's Party published so called Manifest slovenského národa (the Manifest of Slovak Nation) which on the basis of self-determination demanded acquisition of executive power in Slovakia. A Slovak autonomous government was created led by J. Tiso. Representatives of Czechoslovak political parties and members of Slovak autonomous government on 8 October issued a joint declaration, in which confirmed Hlinka's Party motion from June 1938 in regard to Slovak autonomy. A constitutional amendment in regard to Slovak autonomy was adopted on November 1938. Czechoslovak Republic as unitary state ceased to exist.

Political changes, which culminated in abdication of President Edward Beneš and establishment of Slovak autonomy, created a new opportunity for Hungarian leaders and leaders of Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Unlike Poland, Hungarian representation abstained for territorial demands via ultimatum and preferred negotiations. On October 6 Czechoslovak government agreed to negotiate extend of territorial changes with Hungary. Both sides agreed to commence negotiations on October 9 1938 in city of Komárno.<sup>[72]</sup> Surprising was, that delegation consisted exclusively from Slovaks led by J. Tiso. This indicated that members of government in Prague left solving of southern boundaries of Republic to Slovak side.

According to journal *Slovak* "Slovak and Hungarian delegations commenced negotiations on 10 of October when Hungarian side submitted their suggestions how to set a boundary line between both countries." Almost instantly a discontent occurred. Hungarian delegation insisted that as a base for negotiations should be taken statistic of ethnic composition of Slovakia from year 1910, whereas Slovak side was willing to consider only statistic from year 1930.<sup>[73]</sup> It was becoming clear, that neither side will be willing to accept meaningful compromise. In this situation most likely outcome seemed to be that decision will be made by Germany and Italy - two countries who had a paramount influence in Central Europe. Therefore both states were trying to gain sympathy of Germany and Italy. Traditionally Italy was a strong supporter of Hungarian revisionist demands. German dictator A. Hitler, who was disappointed by hesitant approach of Hungary during September crisis, was willing to accommodate Hungarian demands only partially.

Germany as well as Italy would prefer successful conclusion of negotiations without direct interference. In that sense Slovak informed that „Italy and Germany suggested to Budapest to look for a positive conclusion of negotiations.“<sup>[74]</sup> With aim to obtain German support, Slovak delegation led by Prime Minister of autonomous Slovak government Jozef Tiso, travelled to Germany where visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop promised to Slovak delegation that Germany will take a positive attitude to Slovak interests, but demanded that both countries try to find a solution themselves.<sup>[75]</sup> Also Hungarian representation was lobbying to gain support for their demands. As *Novosti* reported, Hungarian Prime Minister Béla Imrédy declared that Hungarian representatives look for support of Italy and Germany.<sup>[76]</sup> Because deep differences in Czechoslovak and Hungarian views on division of Southern Slovakia, even renewed negotiations were not successful. *Slovák* informed, that “Boundary lines controversy is approaching a final phase. Because Hungary refused all suggestions aimed at solving settlement submitted by our government and Hungary demanded that decision will be made by Germany and Italy, there was no objection from our side.”<sup>[77]</sup>

Giving-up Košice was for Slovak members of negotiating team out of question. On contrary, Hungarians demanded annexation of Košice (and some other cities in Southern Slovakia such as Nitra, Lučenec etc.) as a sine qua non condition for settlement. Therefore a minimal chance for accord existed. Deep cleavages in stand of both sides documented declaration of Minister of Schools M. Černák - Slovaks in no circumstance will give-up cities in Southern Slovakia.<sup>[78]</sup> There was only one way - to let international arbitrage decide fate of region in the Southern Slovakia. Both sides agreed that decision should be made by Germany and Italy. On 28 October a Collegium of Czechoslovak ministers approved this decision.<sup>[79]</sup> *Národné noviny* informed about decision of Czechoslovak government.<sup>[80]</sup>

As was already mentioned, Italy - that is Mussolini and Ciano were staunch supporters of Hungary. Their dislike for Czechoslovakia and namely Beneš were deep and lasting. The interest of Slovakia was far less important to them than Hungarian demands. To reinforce Hungarians claims, Ciano tried to persuade

Foreign Minister of Germany, Joachim von Ribbentrop who was at the close of October in Rome that arbitrage would secure equitable solution in setting-up boundary between both countries. Ciano suggested that Germany and Italy should make decision before commencement of arbitrage. Unlike Ribbentrop, Ciano was via his Hungarian experts about Hungary's claims and could be persuasive. Ciano served Hungarian interests well. Hungarian ambassador in Rome informed Budapest, that Ribbentrop agreed with acquisition of Košice, Užhorod and Mukačevo by Hungary.<sup>[81]</sup> Because Czechoslovak site refused suggestion to execute on contested territory a plebiscite, decision was made to let Germany and Italy arbiters have final say in regard to territorial changes and a new boundary line between Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

Decision was made by German and Italy on November 2 1938 in Vienna. Czechoslovak delegation was represented by Prime ministers of Slovak and Ukrainian autonomous governments - Tiso and Vološin. Hungarian delegation was led by Kánya and Teleky. Because both countries agreed to accept decision of arbiters, there were no consultations and arguments voiced, nor preliminary discussions carried out. According to P. Schmidt, who translated conversations between Ribbentrop and Ciano, both politicians to the very last moment argued about precise boundary line draw, erased and draw again dividing lie till pencils were not sharp anymore and thick line caused difficulties when actual boundaries were delineated.

Vienna Arbitrage was a disappointment for Slovaks as well as for Hungarians. The result commented all Slovak periodicals without exception negatively.<sup>[82]</sup>

Prime Minister J. Tiso, did not tried to hide a disappointment when he said that leading powers decided and there is nothing what can be done Slovaks !must lower our heads and work."<sup>[83]</sup>

Despite bitterness and disappointment, in the optimistic tone commented Vienna Arbitrage newspaper *Slovenská vlasť*: "*This horrible day is behind us. The decision was made - an end of insecurity and end of painful tension...We are embittered to depth of our souls - but we stick together and with trust we are looking toward the future.*"<sup>[84]</sup>

As an epilogue, which summarized two decades of live of Hungarian community in Czechoslovakia could be cited words written by daily *Slovák* "*We are staying in front of day of departure. An attitude with which you Hungarians are awaiting unification with Hungary is surely joyful, your peaceful stand is a sign that you are departing not with feelings of hatred but with respect. Our feelings are painful because we are losing you as a decent partner in a field of general goodness.*"<sup>[85]</sup>

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### **Periodical:**

Novosti, 1938

Robotnícke noviny, 1938

Slovák, 1938

Slovenská politika, 1938

Slovenská pravda, 1938

Slovenská vlasť, 1938

Slovenský deník, 1938

Slovenský východ, 1938

### **Archives:**

Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech Republic (AMFA CR), Praha

Slovak National Archive (SNA), Bratislava

State Archive (SA) Košice, division (d.) Rožňava

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[1] According to a regional newspaper for Eastern Slovakia - *Slovenský východ*, G. Szüllő during session of executive committee of LCSP declared that policy of party is not directed against republic, but *Slovenský východ* refuted Szüllő's statement arguing that he maintained his relations with irredentists in Hungary. *Slovenský východ*, 20. VI. 1929, Nemôžeme veriť. (We can not believe).

[2] *Slovenská krajina*, 11. X. 1929, Čo nového?(Whats new?).

[3] SETON-WATSON, R.W. (ed.). *Slovensko kedysi a teraz*. Praha : Orbis, 1931, s. 26. (Slovakia once upon the time and recently.)

[4] Land Office in Bratislava informed security authorities in Slovakia about booklet in which Revision League was sending „greetings to Hungarian workers“ in Rimava-Muran-Sálgotarian Iron Works in Slovakia. According to LOB same booklets were distributed throughout Slovakia. State Archive (SA) Košice, division (d.) Rožňava, fund (f.) County Office (CO) in Rožňava, box (b.) 14, no. 1757 prez.

[5] „Revision League was established on 27 of July 1927 by unification of fourteen social and professional associations...Presently RL has approximately two million members... League is continuously sending articles to foreign publishing houses...It has founded in various European countries organizations whose members are offering lectures...In June 1929 Revision League established Petition Council of League, which is collecting complains rised by minorities and sending them to League of Nations.“ Slovak

National Archive (SNA) Bratislava, f. Police Directory in Bratislava (PDB), b. 771, no. 34874/30 prez. 4. VII. 1930.

[6] SA Košice, d. Rožňava, f. CO in Rožňava, b. 14, no. 1757 prez.

[7] SA Košice, d. Rožňava, f. CO in Rožňava, b. 14, no. 45.144/29 prez.

[8] According authors of resolution „Czechoslovakia violated self-determination right of nationalities, is in state of tension with all her neighbors and constantly is endangering peace in Central Europe even the whole world. Czechoslovakia built a bridge for entry of bolshevism to Central Europe and this was id endangering European culture and its social order.” SA Košice, d. Rožňava, f. CO in Rožňava, b. 42, no. 1757 prez.

[9] Treaty was signed on 4 of June 1920, almost two years after termination of military operation.

[10] A periodical *Slovak politics*, which belonged to group of Agrarian Party newspapers, in derisive manner reported on anti-Trianon activities in Hungary. *Slovenská politika*, 6. VI. 1930, Rieka krokodílskych slz v Maďarsku. (A river of crocodile tears in Hungary).

[11] Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech Republic (AMFA CR), II. section 1918 – 1939, III, row, b. 436.

[12] *Národný týždenník*, 27. I. 1933, Plány Maďarska. (Plans of Hungary).

[13] *Slovenský východ*, 28. VI. 1933, Cesty maďarskej propagandy v Londýne. (Ways of Hungarian propaganda in London).

[14] SA Košice, Police Directory (PD) in Košice, b. 12, no. 6828/33 prez.

[15] Periodical *Slovenská pravda* (Slovak Truth), one of the papers of Hlinka's party declared: „We will never manifest with these gentlemen, to whom can Slovakia primarily thank for her destitute condition, for injustices committed to her even today, which resulted that since establishment of Czechoslovakia 200 thousand Slovaks must emigrate, whereas 200 000 Czechs found here well paid jobs.” *Slovenská Pravda*, 18. VI. 1933, Československé manifestácie proti revízii. (Czechoslovak demonstrations against revision).

[16] *Jehlicska* said: „For thousand years Slovaks lived in Hungary... Clouds appeared on the horizon after French revolution which roused in Europe national feelings. Slovaks had in Hungary only one problem and that was issue of language. Nowadays Slovak nation in Czechoslovakia is bleeding from three wounds: is stripped of its language, they are taking his bread and his religion away.” *Slovenský deník* (Slovak Diary), 3. XII. 1933, Bethlen a Jehlicska v Londýne. (Bethlen and Jehlicska in London).

[17] PEROUTKA, Ferdinand. *Budování státu I*. Praha : Academia. s. 312-314. (Building of State).

[18] President Edvard Beneš recollected hostile attacks of Poland against Czechoslovakia: „And soon after Polish press commenced campaign. It was so aggressive, that German ambassador in Prague, dr. Koch considered necessary reassure personally that Germany has nothing at all with these attacks, because German - Polish agreement does not contain clause which would entice campaign against CSR.” BENEŠ, Edvard. *Mnichovské dny*. Praha : Svoboda, 1968, s. 40.



[19] „By the fact that Poland did not ratify Trianon Peace Treaty, refused enter Little Agreement and criticized anti-Hungarian activities, ostentatiously shown, that is decided to maintain good relations with Hungary...All in all Polish policy by revision of Czechoslovak-Hungarian boundary line aimed at connection with Hungary, isolated Czechoslovakia from Soviet Russia and this way prepared situation for realization her own central European concepts.” DEÁK, Ladislav. *Hra o Slovensko*. Bratislava : VEDA, 1991, s. 22. (A play for Slovakia).

[20] *Robotnícke noviny*, 24. VI. 1934, Štáb maďarskej iredenty sišiel sa v Poľsku. (Leaders of Hungarian irredenta met in Poland).

[21] AMFA CR, II. section 1918 - 1939, III, row, b. 325.

[22] *Slovenský deník*, 16. IX. 1934, Miesto revizionizmu iredentizmus. Nová taktika grófa Bethlena - Veľká radosť v tábore Szüllővcov. (Instead of revision an irredenta. A new tactic of count Bethlen. Great enjoyment in camp of Szüllő adherents).

[23] *Slovenský východ*, 2. X. 1934, Maďarsko na rozcestí či na scestí? (Is Hungary on crossroads or on skid row?).

[24] AMFA CR II. sekcion 1918 - 1939 III, row, b. 325, no. 2319.

[25] *Slovenský východ*, 8. - 13. X. 1935, Maďarský revizionizmus a Československo. (Hungarian revisionism and Czechoslovakia).

[26] More about activities of Lord Rothermere which culminated in a campaign supported and in some cases incited by Slovak authorities in MICHELA Miroslav. Reakcie slovenských politických kruhov a tlače na Rothermerovu akciu (1927 - 1928). (Reactions of Slovak political circles and press on Rothermere Action) In *Historický časopis*, 2004, roč. 52, č. 3, s. 503-522.

[27] Rothermere was allegedly pleased by numerous suggestions that he should candidate on Hungarian throne, but refused with explanation that a better selection would be a person of Hungarian extraction.

[28] *Slovenský východ*, 8. - 13. X. 1935, Maďarský revizionizmus a Československo. (Hungarian revisionism and Czechoslovakia).

[29] AMFA CR II. section 1918 - 1939 III, row, b. 325, no. 907/1936.

[30] POMPORTLOVÁ Marta. *ČSR a Maďarsko 1918 - 1938*. Brno : Universita J. E. Purkyně, 1986, s. 101. (CSR and Hungary).

[31] „Magazines are vividly commenting visit of Hungarian Regent Horthy in Germany where he met German Chancellor Hitler. All attention is devoted to relations between Hungary and Germany. According to periodical “Matin” Regent Horthy informed Hitler about implementation of general military duty in Hungary and asked Hitler’s support in case of Little Entente reaction. Periodical “Ouvre” stated: It seem that revisionism is entering to a new period.” *Slovenský východ*, 28. VIII. 1936. Nové fázy maďarského revizionizmu. (New phase of Hungarian revisionism).

[32] DEÁK L. *Hra o Slovensko*, s. 46-47.

[33] Daily *Robotnícke noviny* wrote that „*Representatives of Austria and Italy again recognized right of Hungary to be equal in rearmament and representatives of all three governments are deeming as inevitable to realize this principle in a short time.*“ *Robotnícke noviny*, 14. I. 1938. Zbrojenie Maďarska a ochota k spolupráci so susedmi. (Hungary's rearmament and her readiness to cooperate with neighbors).

[34] In regard to future development of situation in Austria, Hungarian foreign minister was pessimistic, even resigned: "*Mussolini will do nothing today to stop gradual development leading to Anschluss' ...France and England will in the future exhibit same measure disregard, with which in the past accepted occupation of Rhineland and when 80 million strong Germany will be here, nobody will be able stop her political and economic hegemony in the Central Europe.*" From these word it is clear that *mr. Kánya is aware of danger, however he is foretelling German expansion with certain fatalism to the will of God as a thing on which he nor Hungary can change nothing.*" AMFA CR, Section Ministry of foreign Affairs (MFA) 1918 - 1939, f. VIII/1, Embassy of CSR in Budapest (Vyslanectví Československé republiky v Budapešti), b. 27, Topic: Conversation of Kánya about meeting in Obersalzburg. (Věc: Rozhovor s p. Kányou o schůzce na Obersalzburgu).

[35] AMFA CR, Section MFA 1918 - 1939, f. VIII/1, Embassy of CSR in Budapest (Vyslanectví Československé republiky v Budapešti), b. 27. Topic: Impact of Anschluss upon public opinion in Hungary. (Věc: Ohlas „Anšlusu“ ve veřejném mínění v Maďarsku).

[36] SAKMYSTER, Thomas, L. *Hungary, the Great Powers, and the Danubian crisis, 1936 - 1939*. Athens : University of Georgia Press, 1980, s. 134.

[37] AMFA CR, Section MFA 1918 - 1939, f. VIII/1, Embassy of CSR in Budapest (Vyslanectví Československé republiky v Budapešti), b. 27. Topic: Session of foreign commission of both chambers - expose of Minister Kánya. (Věc: Zasedání zahraniční komise obou sněmoven - exposé ministra Kányi).

AMFA CR, Section MFA 1918 - 1939, f. VIII/1, Embassy of CSR in Budapest (Vyslanectví Československé republiky v Budapešti), b. 27. Topic: Impact of Anschluss upon public opinion in Hungary. (Věc: Ohlas „Anšlusu“ ve veřejném mínění v Maďarsku).

[39] United Hungarian Party was created via fusion of two parties, Land Christian-Socialist Party and Hungarian National Party, which held a dominant position in Hungarian community, in year 1936. To large extent the fusion was result of pressure of Hungarian government and above described differences between these parties remained. But idea that in changing political environment Hungarian minority represented by united political organization can more successfully assert its rights prevailed.

[40] „*Hungarian united parties (National and Christ. Socialist) are developing in Hungarian regions intensive pressure (and not always only psychic) upon Hungarian activists, to get them to leave Czechoslovak political parties and same as Germans, join Hungarian opposition with aim to unite all Hungarian minority members. However, their results are negligible - only here and then they were successful to gain several Hungarian members of Agrarian Party, but workers organized in Social Democratic Party stand firmly.*“ *Robotnícke noviny*, 26. IV. 1938. Národnostnú otázku nemožno riešiť iredentou a demagógiou. (National issue cannot be solved by irredenta and demagoguery).

[41] „*Hungarian opposition issued an appel, addressed to adherents of Hungarian activism, in which is telling that all Hungarians in Republic must unite and naturally and exclusively in frame of United Opposition Party...this appel had approximately 20 flowery sentences - approximately 20 people let themselves to be caught by it and about each of them referred Hungarian press in detail.*“ *Slovenský juh*, 30. IV. 1938, Maďarský aktivizmus. (Hungarian activism).

[42] *Novosti*, 28. IV. 1938, Maďarskí opozičníci chytajú sa henleinovských metód. (Hungarian opposition is

following methods of Henlein).

[43] „From the agrarian circles in Bratislava we are getting an information which indicate total collapse of so called Hungarian activism...As of today, following example of Germans those organization in Hungarian villages, which joined Agrarian Party, without exception are transferring to united Hungarian opposition parties...So, agrarian activist policy with Hungarians did not pay and did not pay policy of Prague with Germans.“ *Slovák*, 12. V. 1938, Krach maďarského aktivizmu na Slovensku. (Collapse of Hungarian activism in Slovakia).

[44] „Abdication of Hungarian government is primarily result of situation in Germany. It was caused by a general tension in the country as a result of disturbances enticed by Szalasi adherents, which called for interference by a stronger hand. Imrédy is a Catholic and anti-Nazi oriented. The task of his government will be internal reinforcement of Hungary, so country can face external ganger. According to some sources Imrédy's government will be oriented on cooperation with Little Entente.“ *A-Zet*, 14. V. 1938, Demise vlády v Maďarsku. (Abdication of Hungarian government). A month later *A-Zet* reported, that „L'Oeuvre is analysing Czech-Hungarian relations and is informing: For Prague it is very positive, that Hungarian Prime Minister today is Imrédy, who by every means is resisting Hitlerite tendencies in Hungary. Imrédy is generous and brave man, who deserves a full moral support of Europe.“ *A-Zet*, 15. VI. 1938, Čs. maďarské vzťahy príznivé. (Cz.-Hungarian relations are positive).

[45] *Slovenská politika*, 18. V. 1938, Imrédy vyhlásil vojnu nacistom. (Imrédy declared a war on Nazis.)

[46] „Judging from reaction of press, in political life of Hungary is proceeding great shift, at this time only behind scene. The government of Imrédy want to place its support on broader base, so it can face rise of Nazism propagated and stirred-up by radical right, which is a segment of government party NEP.“ *Slovák*, 20. V. 1938. Politické preskupenie v Maďarsku. (Political shift in Hungary).

[47] „Imrédy half stealthily, but sharply spoke - against Nazism in Hungary: language of this movement transferred from abroad (that is from Germany) and translated to Hungarian is - hardly understandable for honest Hungarian ears, because is degrading everything what Hungary has and for what is striving.“ *Slovenský denník*, 28. VI. 1938. Maďarsko: Pripravovať obranu! (Hungary: to prepare defense!).

[48] *Slovák*, 1. VII. 1938, Národnostný štatút a Maďari. (A Statute of Nationalities and Hungarians).

[49] *Robotnícke noviny*, 6. VIII. 1938, *Provokatívne požiadavky Esterházyho Maďarov*. (Provocative demands of Esterházy's Hungarians).

[50] DEÁK, Ladislav. *Slovensko v politike Maďarska v rokoch 1938 - 1939*. Bratislava : VEDA, 1990, s. 48. (Slovakia in politics of Hungary).

[51] *Robotnícke noviny*, 23. VIII. 1938, Horthy u Hitlera v Kiele. (Horthy is visiting Hitler in Kiel).

[52] *Slovenská politika*, 23. VIII. 1938, *Horthy k Hitlerovi*. (Horthy to Hitler).

[53] „The highest wrath of Berlin was caused by negotiations of Hungary with Little Entente...it is sure that Hungarians went to Berlin with idea not to be pushed by Hitler to any military adventure. Without giving-up their revisionist claims toward Czechoslovakia, they hoped in their fulfilment without risk via peaceful means - and future development confirmed expectations.“ ČELOVSKÝ, Bořivoj. *Mníchovská dohoda 1938*. Ostrava : Nakladatelství Tilium, 1999, s. 271. (Munich Agreement 1938).

[54] „Between countries of Little Entente and Hungary already a longer time are going on diplomatic

*negotiations aimed on conclusion of an agreement which would place their mutual relations on a new basis. The main points should be acknowledgement of right of Hungary to military build-up and at the same time an agreement to renounce military aggression and also to take into consideration a certain progress insolving of minority status."* Slovenský deník, 14. VIII. 1938, Dohoda s Maďarskom len s celou Malou dohodou. (An agreement between Hungary and Little Entente as a whole).

[55] *„Negotiations which were ongoing from last year between Hungary on one side and Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia on the other side, permeated by common wish to get rid of everything which could slow development of good neighborhood between Hungary and these three states, enabled to come to preliminary agreements...to recognize from side of states of Little Entente recognition equal position of Hungary to arm and renounce any use of force between Hungary and these countries."* Slovenská politika, 25. VIII. 1938, Usmierenie v Dunajskej kotline: Dohoda s Maďarskom. (Rapprochement in Donau Basin: Agreement with Hungary).

[56] *„It is necessary to especially underline this circumstance, that agreement was reached also with Czechoslovakia. It is not secret, that Hungarian political circles were endeavoring for the whole year to reach partial agreement only with Yugoslavia and Romania. Considering present penetration of Germany influence into Hungarian politics, a worry was that partial agreements could become a tool of German imperialism against Czechoslovakia."* Slovenské zvesti, 25. VIII. 1938. Dohoda Maďarska s Malou dohodou. (Agreement of Hungary with Little Entente).

[57] Kánya declared: *„You know that freedom of action and preservation of neutrality was always my policy; however situation from the outset could be shaped in that way, that circumstance could be stronger than political principles and agreements."* AMFA CR, Section MFA 1918 - 1939, f. VIII/1, Embassy of CSR in Budapest (Vyslanectví Československé republiky v Budapešti), b. 28.

[58] ČELOVSKÝ, Bořivoj. *Mnichovská dohoda...*, s. 271.

[59] *Slovenská politika*, 4. IX. 1938, Maďarsko - neutrálne. (Hungary - neutral).

[60] AMFA CR, Section MFA 1918 - 1939, f. VIII/1, Embassy of CSR in Budapest (Vyslanectví Československé republiky v Budapešti), b. 28.

[61] *„Selection was done by Chamberlain, because Runciman was one of his close friends; Prime minister trusted him. Runciman was presently out of government service, and this was very suitable, because he was not offered as representative of British government, only as an „independent person“."* KÁRNÍK, Zdeněk. *České země v éře První republiky (1918 - 1938) Díl třetí o přežití a o život (1936 - 1938)*. Praha : Libri, 2003, s. 550-551. (Czech Lands in the Era of First Republic (1918 - 1939) Part there, about survival and life).

[62] Document, which was written in English language, consisted of 15 parts, in which a critical analysis of situation of Hungarian community in the sphere of politics, economy, culture and language rights was elaborated.

[63] SIMON Attila. *The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1938*. New York : Columbia University Press, 2012, s. 190..

[64] SIMON A. *The Hungarians of Slovakia...*, s. 190.

[65] *Slovenský deník*, 22.IX.1939. Chcú pripojiť Slovensko k Maďarsku. (They want to annex Slovakia to Hungary).



[66] LAFFAN, R. D. G. *Survey of international affairs 1938. Volume II The Crisis over Czechoslovakia January to September 1938*. London, New York, Toronto : Oxford University Press, 1951, s. 432.

[67] JUHÁSZ, Gyula. *Hungarian foreign policy*. Budapest : Akadémiai kiadó, 1979, s. 142.

[68] *Robotnícke noviny*, 23. IX. 1938, Hoci vedia, že príde teraz rad na nich Poliaci i Maďari siahajú s Hitlerom po našom území. (Even they know, that their turn will come, Polaks and Hungarians are reaching together with Hitler for our territory).

[69] *Slovenská politika*, 4. X. 1938. Hlásia sa i Maďari. (Also Hungarians are presenting demands).

[70] For example *Národné noviny*, 4. X. 1938 Čo dáme Maďarsku? (What we will give to Hungarians?).

[71] *Novosti*, 4. X. 1938, Maďarská vláda žiada právo sebaurčenia pre našich Maďarov. (Hungarian government is requesting right of self-determination for our Hungarians).

[72] *Robotnícke noviny*, 9. X. 1938, Vyjednávane s Maďarskom začne sa v nedeľu. (Negotiation with Hungary will commence on Sunday).

[73] *Slovák*, 12. X. 1938. Za pozornosti svetovej verejnej mienky rokuje sa v Komárne o revízii hraníc. (Under scrutiny of world opinion negotiations are going on in Komarno).

[74] *Slovák*, 12. X. 1938. Za pozornosti svetovej verejnej mienky rokuje sa v Komárne o revízii hraníc. (Under scrutiny of world opinion negotiations are going on in Komarno).

[75] *Národné noviny*, 22. X. 1938. Diplomatický boj o hranice Slovenska. (A diplomatic war for boundaries of Slovakia).

[76] *Novosti (Slovenský Východ)*, 22. X. 1938. Košice zostanú naše. (City of Košice will remain ours).

[77] *Slovák*, 29. X. 1938. Plebiscit nebude. (Plebiscit will not be enacted).

[78] *Slovenská politika*, 29. X. 1938. *Pred rozhodnutím*. (Before decision).

[79] *Novosti*, 30.X.1938. *Arbitráž Nemecka a Talianska v česko-slovensko-maďarskom spore*. (Arbitrage of Germany and Italy in Czechoslovak-Hungarian discrepancy)

[80] „Minister of , Foreign Affairs dr. František Chvalkovský submitted yesterday about 7 P. M., to his Royal Ambassador Wettstein an answer on note of Hungarian government from October 27 of this year after consultations with members of Slovak and Sub-Carpathian government during yesterday Cabinet of Minsters The answer in the interest of speeding-up solution is suggesting, that request of both governments for arbitrage would be submitted to Berlin and Rome in next 24 hours.“ *Národné noviny*, 30. X. 1938. Na návrh našej vlády žiadosť o arbitráž bola predložená Berlínu a Rímu. (A suggestion of our government was submitted to Berlin and Rome).

[81] DEÁK, L. *Slovensko v politike Maďarska...*, s. 167.

[82] *Robotnícke noviny*, 4. XI. 1938, Po viedenskom výroku. (After Vienna decision). *Národné noviny*, 4. XI. 1938, Vo Viedni padlo ukrutné rozhodnutie. Slovensko ožobráčené. (A cruel decision was adopted in Vienna. Slovakia was impoverished). *A-Zet*, 4. XI. 1938, Ministerský predseda dr. Jozef Tiso „Stali sme sa obeťou nespravodlivosti.“ (Prime Minister J. Tiso „We became a victim of injustice).

[83] *Robotnícke noviny*, 4.XI.1938. *Po viedenskom výroku*. (After Vienna decision).

[84] *Slovenská vlasť*, 4.XI.1938. *Ortieľ nás nezlomil* (A verdict did not break us).

[85] *Slovák*, 4.XI.1938. *Rana, ktorú dostalo Slovensko, je veľká*. (Wound which Slovakia suffered is big).